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Abstract
 Corporate governance has been a public interest in the past decades as an effect of 
corporate scandals and abuses of managerial power. In the new era of governance, where 
governance defines as the system by which organizations are directed and controlled, and calls on 
boards of directors to take responsibility for the governance of their firms, the agency problem is 
that agents often have ideas to use capital that lies outside the intent purpose of the principals. 
Governance presents to address this agency problem. Governor act as an intermediary, as the 
principals representative, ensuring capital is directed to the right purpose. The governors also act 
as the voice of the agents to the principals, articulating their ideas for uses of capital and making 
an accounting of the use of capital back to the principals. The scripture showcase the story of 
Joseph and see the governance issues and how he practiced corporate governance principals of 
transparency, fairness, accountability and responsibility in his life over four thousand years ago. 
Joseph story showcase his governance in the land of Egypt. The principal-agent relationship he 
has with the Pharaoh, prison warden, Potiphar and Jacob, his father. The character of Joseph 
exemplifies a model of good corporate governance. He provide example that good corporate 
governance can be exercised as an agent to his principal in the lowliest place on earth, and more so 
an example of good corporate governance to his principal in heaven, God Almighty. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder 
         theory, transparency, fairness, accountability, responsibility 
Introduction
 A number of studies in academic journals have used literature in papers investigating 
corporate governance models (Douma, 1997; Jacoby, 2000; Kay and Silberston, 1995; Maignan 
and Ferrell, 2003), governance reforms (Westphal and Zajac, 1998) board behavior and 
effectiveness (Kose and Senbet, 1998; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995) and executive compensation 
(Conyon and Schwalbach, 2000). In recent years, there has been a propagation of public interest 
into corporate governance as an effect of corporate scandals such as Enron or WorldCom and 
abuses of managerial power in the form of fat cat salaries and bonuses (Plender, 2003). 
 The story of Joseph (Genesis 37:2-36; 39:1-37-47) showcase the governance issues. 
From the scripture we accounts Joseph's life, and see that corporate governance was practiced over 
four thousand years ago. This story provides lessons on the significance of ethical use of power and 
the significance of integrity in his governance. The traits essentially possessed by Joseph in his 
early life and his leadership practiced through his governance in the land of Egypt.
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 Why Governance?
  The new era in governance has been ushered in across the world, in all sectors and 
industries, in the past decade, as it spearheaded by: Britain's Cadbury Report, which defines 
governance as the system by which organizations are directed and controlled, and calls on boards 
of directors to take responsibility for the governance of their firms (Report on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992). In Canada's Dey Report, Where Were The Directors, it 
was noted calling on boards to explicitly assume responsibility for governance including 
leadership, stewardship, risk management and information (Corporate Governance Guidelines, 
1994). Also, The U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), which requires boards and three core 
committees (Audit, Governance, Compensation) to take direct responsibility for critical elements 
of oversight and control. The corporate governance issues itself is surface due to the outline of 
separation of ownership and management of a company.
 Nations around the world are instigating far-reaching program for corporate governance 
reform, as evidenced by the proliferation of corporate governance codes and policy documents, 
voluntary or mandatory, both at the national and supra-national level. The concern on the 
implementation of good corporate governance is rising due to scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, 
Tyco, London & Commonwealth, Poly Peck, Maxwell, etc (Danuri, 2004). The present focus on 
corporate governance will be maintained into the future and thus, over time, corporate governance 
issues will grow in importance, rather than fade into insignificance. The phenomenal growth of 
interest in corporate governance has been accompanied by a growing body of academic research. 
As the discipline matures, far greater definition and clarity are being achieved concerning the 
nature of corporate governance. This new era is actually a return to the way corporations 
(organizations) were originally governed, and, according to Agency theory, ought to be governed.
 Agency Theory 
 Agency theory was articulated by Adam Smith (1776). Basically what he said is that the 
members of every social organization, from hunter gatherer tribes to corporations to nations, are 
rapidly specialize into different groups, depending on their competencies and expertise: (a) 
Principals or owners are people with a knack for accumulating capital (wealth, resources); and (b) 
Agents or management are people with a surplus of ideas to effectively use that capital and get 
things done, like for example, by creating more value. Economics is all about how we allocate 
these scarce resources (Mankiw, 2004), resources from the principals to their most effective uses 
by the agents. The agency problem is that agents often have ideas to use capital that lies outside the 
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intent purpose of the principals. This can apply to a single (financial) or triple (economic, social, 
environmental) bottom line: principals have a purpose in mind for their resources, and agents aim 
to accomplish those.  
 Governance presents to address this agency problem. Governors act as an intermediary 
(boards in corporations), as the principals representative (steward, trustee, fiduciary) with the 
agents, ensuring capital is directed to the right purpose. The governors also act as the voice of the 
agents to the principals, articulating their ideas for uses of capital and making an accounting of the 
use of capital back to the principals. The governors therefore have these 4 core responsibilities, 
which comprise: (1) Leadership, set the strategic direction of the organization (purpose, mission) 
and put in place the leadership (CEO selection, board renewal) to accomplish that direction; (2) 
Stewardship, shepherd resources belonging to others (trustee), i.e. risk management, allocation of 
duties/roles/responsibilities, delineation of authority; (3) Monitoring: receive and review 
measures of performance, and hold management (CEO) accountable for success (achieving the 
purpose, creating value); and (4) Reporting, account to the principals (owners, investors, 
stakeholders) on the results of using their capital (resources). 
The principals and agents have specific core responsibilities as well: good governance is 
not about an adversarial or confrontational relationship among the 3 players, but each identifying 
and fulfilling their own unique competencies. Principals have three core responsibilities in agency 
governance: (a) Select and put in place or elect or appoint the governors or board of 
directors/trustees; (b) Select and put in place or elect or appoint the auditors (external, independent 
body that tests and reports on the integrity of financial reporting and controls); and (c) Ensure there 
is an effective governance system in place. Brown (2004) describe the this in an illustration of 
organization being a ship: the principals are the ones who cause the ship to be built, who pay for it, 
and who have in mind an initial destination or mission. The governors are the rudder of the ship, 
setting its direction, and using controls. Diagnostic measures and course changes used to ensure 
that direction. And, the agents are responsible for every other duty on the ship: from the bridge to 
the boiler room, the lookouts, decks, and holds, the operations and activities throughout the 
organization. 
 In modern economies, the management and control of companies is increasingly 
separated from the ownership. It is in line with the Agency Theory that pointing out the importance 
on separating day to day corporate management from the owners to the managers. The purpose of 
the separation system is to create efficiency and effectiveness by hiring professional agents in 
managing the company. Here, agency theory having its roots in economic theory was exposited by 
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Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and further developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Agency 
theory here defined as relationship between principals and agents. Here, the principal such as 
shareholders and agents such as the company executives and managers. In this theory, 
shareholders who are the owners or principals of the company, hires the agents to perform work. 
Principals delegate the running of business to the directors or managers, who are the shareholder's 
agents. It is happened where the CEOs of public companies have responsibility to act as agents for 
the owners. While the owners seek to gain information through evaluation, they develop incentive 
systems to ensure agent actions in the owner's interests. Agency theorists attempt to design the 
most cost effective information systems (FCGI, 2006). However there is a problem in this 
separation of corporate management and ownership as well. Managers may seek to maximize their 
own self-interest at the expense of shareholders. Furthermore this separation may lead to a lack of 
transparency in the use of funds in the company and in the proper balancing of the interests of, for 
instance, shareholders and managers and of controlling and minority shareholders. Dellaportas et. 
al. (2005) sees that there are more issues that need to be tackles as in example, accountability to 
shareholders, regulators and the public and also such issues as transparency and fairness and 
reporting matters (p. 5). 
 
 Corporate Governance 
 Corporate governance, a term that scarcely existed before the 1990s, is now universally 
invoked wherever business and finance are discussed (Keasey, Thompson and Wright, 2006, p. 1). 
The subject has spawned consultancies, academic degrees, encyclopedias, innumerable articles, 
conferences and speeches. Almost all the OECD nations are currently revising their corporate 
governance practices or have recently done so. Moreover, Keasey, Thompson, and Wright (2006) 
argue that the subject good governance has also become a destination board for a bandwagon 
carrying those who would take the corporation in myriad directions (p. 1). A director according to 
Webster's dictionary is one of a group of persons entrusted with the overall direction of a corporate 
enterprise. A board of directors is a group of individuals who are elected by the ownership of a 
corporation to have oversight and guidance over management and who look out for shareholders' 
interests. The act of oversight and direction is referred to as governance. If the board is to operate 
effectively it must create a culture of openness and trust, combined with mutual respect. Such an 
environment creates a virtuous circle of behavior and expectations, which can all too easily 
degenerate into a vicious circle of behavior. Effective boards therefore need a proper balance of 
skills and experience. In the Enron Corporation bankruptcy and scandal, the firm's board of 
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directors is being sued by shareholders for mismanaging interests (Plender, 2003). New 
accounting rules in the United States and Europe are being passed to enhance corporate-
governance codes and to require much more extensive financial disclosure among publicly held 
firms. The roles and duties of a board of directors can be divided into four categories:  control and 
oversight of management, adherence to legal prescriptions, consideration of stakeholders' 
interests, and advancement of stockholders' rights. 
Wallace & Zinkin (2005) argue that good corporate governance is determined by number 
of factors, moreover said that effective codes of governance that lead to transparent reporting; 
effective board governance and process; effective independent directors; informed business 
decisions; a culture of risk management embedded in the organization as a whole; and 
shareholders actively interested in ensuring that good corporate governance is practiced. Thus, 
reporting procedures and disclosures by themselves are unfortunately no guarantee of good 
corporate governance, as Enron proved only too clearly (p. 34). The Forum for Corporate 
Governance in Indonesia (2006) points out that objective of corporate governance is to create 
added value to the stakeholders. More narrowly, the terms of corporate governance can be used to 
describe just the role and practices of the board of executives/the board of directors, the board of 
commissioners, managers, and shareholders. There are four essential elements of corporate 
governance elaborated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). The elements are: fairness, transparency, accountability, responsibility. (OECD as 
described in FCGI, 2006)
 Higgs (2003) suggest that to operate effectively means to create a culture of openness and 
trust, combined with mutual respect (p. 19). Hardy (1984) suggest that in order to fulfill its 
monitoring function, the  board must require periodic performance reports from the chief 
executive officer-summaries of performance on all objectives related to long range goals. Cadbury 
sees that board effectiveness can be judged by performance against appropriate benchmarks and 
accountability is measured by the decree to which Boards respond to the needs of those they are 
there to serve. The two go together to the extent that, the more accountable a company is the more 
its standards of performance are set objectively from outside the enterprise (As seen in Wallace & 
Zinkin, 2005, p. 34). 
 Gavino, et. al. (2001) sees that effective governance is usually characterized by the 
elements such as accountability as the basis for all relationships (p. 222). Dellaportas, et. al. (2005) 
also sees that governance and accountability are about relationships. The word governance refers 
to authority and control. Governance means the strategy, method and manner in which a group of 
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people or so called the governance body directs, controls, and manages an organization. The 
governance body of a corporation normally rests with the board of directors and senior 
management, who possess the authority to govern or control. With authority comes responsibility. 
Accountability is the responsibility of those charged with governance to account for their choices, 
decisions and actions (p. 5).
Competing Governance Theories
 Corporations today have become a powerful and dominant institution in a way they can 
reach to every corner of the globe. They have capabilities and influences that can influenced 
economies and various aspect of social landscape. The need of accountability is greater and 
corporate governance becomes an important factor in the relationship between management, 
shareholders and stakeholders (Ching et al, 2006). Henceforth, corporate governance means a 
different thing for different organization, as the following governance theories are explained.
Principal-Agent Theory
 The agency theory is also known as principal-agent problem or theory. In the principal-
agent theory, the relationships of principal and agent should reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk-bearing costs. The assumption lies here is that problem may occur since that 
owners' interests may differ from managers' interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). From the perspective of 
this theory, the role of the board member can be seen as supervisor that was chosen to represent 
owner's interests and be independent of management. Moreover, the function of the board can be 
seen as conformance, where the board is to safeguard owner's resources and interests and 
supervise management and staff. However, the emphasis on the issue of control may suppress 
innovation and risk taking, and might condense staff motivation. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) sees agency theory from economic view point in production and 
information cost and organization. Public sector and Crown corporations, co-operatives, hybrid 
and mixed governance models and entities can all benefit from the basic principles and lines of 
authority and accountability expressed in Agency Theory. 
 The growth of corporations and the accompanying separation of ownership and control 
have spawned a vast literature into the way in which corporations are governed (Denis, 2001). 
Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations on 1776 remarked on the problems associated with self-
interested managers pursuing their own utility rather than that of the shareholders of the company. 
These conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers have been investigated through 
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the lens of principal-agent theory which was first formally articulated by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Principal-agent theory postulates that by delegating the management of companies to 
managers (agents), the owners (principals) have to create mechanisms to align the agents' interests 
with their own. This in turn gives rise to agency costs in the form of monitoring costs, bonding 
costs and potential residual losses (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308). Jensen and Meckling's 
seminal paper gave rise to a plethora of financial economics and accounting literature that has 
sought to describe and measure agency costs, and categorize and evaluate mechanisms of 
corporate governance, both internal and external (Charkham, 1994; Denis, 2001; Monks and 
Minow, 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Stakeholder Theory  
 An alternative perspective on corporate governance emerged in the wake of 
developments in stakeholder theory developed by Freeman (1984).  Freeman and Evan (1990) 
contend that a conceptualization of firms in terms of bilateral contracts, as postulated by the 
principal-agent theory, is inadequate since it does not sufficiently account for the 
interconnectedness of bilateral contracts or indeed the influence of external agencies 
(stakeholders) on the management-shareholder contracts. Instead, Freeman and Evan (1990) 
argue for a multilateral contractarian conceptualization of the firm, a complex system of 
bargaining between agents and multiple stakeholders. Such a conceptualization, however, raises a 
number of problems. First Goodpaster (1991) points towards the danger of confusing fiduciary 
and non-fiduciary obligation to stakeholders (see also Marcoux, 2003). Following Milton 
Friedman, Goodpaster argues that managers have a special fiduciary duty to shareholders, and that 
stakeholder management should not be seen as an extension of fiduciary obligations to a wider 
stakeholder group (multi-fiduciary) but rather an extension of non-fiduciary obligations. Thus, 
corporate governance from a stakeholder perspective “… is not an expansion of the list of 
principals, but a gloss on the principal-agent relationship itself” (Goodpaster, 1991, p. 68). 
Dellaportas et. al. (2005) suggests that within the stakeholder perspective, the success of an 
organization depends on its ability to balance the conflicting demands of its various stakeholders. 
Stakeholder theory is a descriptive theory that attempts to gain stakeholder support and thus 
minimize the cost of dealing with complaints and actions that might otherwise affect them. 
Corporate stakeholders have traditionally been identified as those parties with a direct financial 
interest in an organization, such as stakeholders and other finance providers (p. 206). However, the 
concept of a stakeholder group has been broadened to include not only equity investors and 
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creditors, but also employees, analysts, business contacts, the government and the public. Thus, 
companies may be accountable to any person or organization affected by their activities or 
otherwise having a right to information about them (Dellaportas, 2005, p. 207). Increasingly, 
stakeholder theory is seen as a credible alternative to principal-agent theory (Freeman, 1994; 
Hasnas, 1998). 
Stewardship Theory
 Stewardship theory origin is from psychology and sociology, Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson (1997) sees it as a steward protects and maximizes shareholders wealth. The function 
of steward can be maximized through firm performance. Looking from the perspective of this 
theory, stewards can be seen as company management working to protects and make profits for the 
shareholders. Conversely from agency theory, Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue that 
stewardship theory did not stress on the perspective of individualism but more on top management 
role of being a stewards. Steward is integrating their goals as part of the organization. According to 
Donaldson & Davis (1994), managers are principally motivated by achievement and 
responsibility. By giving needs of managers for responsible, self-directed work, organizations 
may be better served to free managers from subservience to non-executive director dominated 
boards. 
 Agyris (1973) sees agency theory looks at people as an economic being. Stewardship 
theory, on the other hand, recognizes the importance of structures that empower the steward built 
on trust (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). It stresses on the position of employees or executives to act 
more autonomously so that the shareholders' returns are maximized. Indeed, this can minimize the 
costs aimed at monitoring and controlling behaviours (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). In 
stewardship theory, the assumption lies is that owners and managers have similar interests. The 
role of the board is to be partner. Their role furthermore are to improve performance through add 
value to top decisions/strategy and partner management. However, supporting stewardship theory 
are the individuals who contribute their own money resources and other resources to non-profit 
organizations to become a director. Persson, Roland & Tabellini (1996) made provision in their 
equations to include the welfare contributed by controllers to stakeholders through introducing a 
division of powers.
Joseph's Governance
 The Bible suggests that Joseph is a leader by counting his two dreams that suggest he will 
rule over the member of his family (Genesis 37:5-10). As the story continues it is clear that God 
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was with Joseph in his life as stated, “God was with Joseph and he became a successful man” 
(Genesis 39:2). Corporate governance according to Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) are fairness, transparency, accountability, responsibility (as described in 
FCGI, 2006). The focus of leadership is on responsibility and accountability, rather than on 
authority and power (see Heb.13:17) Although Potiphar (Gen.39:6), the jailer (Gen.39:23) and 
Pharoah (Gen.41:49) did not require an accounting, Joseph is showing his responsibility to them.
Joseph as a Youth
 Joseph is the son of Jacob. The Bible (Genesis 37:5-10) suggests he is a leader since his 
two dreams that suggest he will rule over the members his family. Accordance with agency theory, 
Jacob and Joseph portrays the principal-agent relationship as Jacob favors Joseph over his other 
sons. As seen when he was seventeen-years old, Jacob make him a special garment with many 
colors which is a symbol of royalty (Speiser, 1964, pp. 289-90) or even lordship (Sarna, 1966, p. 
212). Jacob attempts to designate Joseph as his successor (Genesis 37). As the story progress, 
Jacob clearly believes in Joseph' dreams that it would be his future destiny (Genesis 37:10-11). He 
designates Joseph to oversee his brothers when they were shepherding their flock in the field. 
However, the governance here are contrary to the approach of OECD's governance in 
responsibility, fairness, accountability, and the lack of transparency are clearly emerges within the 
brothers. Joseph eventually becomes victim to his brothers' jealousy where they decide to kill him 
but instead place him in a pit. Later on they sold him to a merchant, who then sell him as a slave to 
Potiphar, an Egyptian and official in Pharaoh's court. 
 Corporate governance can be seen in the life of Joseph since his day of youth in the house 
of Jacob. In the four areas of governance by OECD, Jacob entrust Joseph with responsibility. Jacob 
designates the work of overseeing his sons in the field to Joseph (Gen. 37:14). The second area is 
on transparency; in this area Joseph is seen to shown his openness to his family. Joseph reveals 
information of his two dreams. However, Jacob rebuke Joseph when he reveals the dreams (Gen. 
37:10), nevertheless, Jacob seem to approve his transparency as he kept it in his heart (Gen. 37:11). 
The third area is on accountability; Joseph accountability is seen as he monitors his brothers and 
report it directly to his father. The fourth area of fairness is the element of governance that was 
tested. The principal-agent relationship shows close relationship that Jacob has as he favors Joseph 
over his other sons and makes him a special garment (Gen. 37:3). The special treatment arouse 
jealousy and hatred, this is a sign of unfair treatment from the brothers perspective (Gen. 37:4).
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Joseph as Potiphar's Steward
 Joseph's authority does not come from his own gifting, but is delegated from others. 
Joseph is given the responsibility, does not assume it himself. He performs the principal-agent 
relationship. Potiphar was the principal and Joseph was the agent. Joseph lived in Potiphar's house 
as household slave and becomes Potiphar's attendant. Potiphar designate authority to Joseph to be 
in charge of his household (Gen.39:2-6). Joseph required to serve, because he was Potiphar's slave 
– but went above and beyond the call of duty.
 Corporate governance was implied in the life of Joseph as Potiphar's steward. In the four 
areas of governance by OECD, Joseph received responsibility by Potiphar and he performs his 
duty and responsibility through superior management skills. Joseph was promoted from servant 
slave to manager of Potiphar's estate. The responsibility designate was to overseeing the house of 
Potiphar's to him. The second area is on fairness, Potiphar favors Joseph as a manager of his estate. 
Joseph work exemplified his fairness towards the servant of the house. Potiphar was showed not to 
worry and concern about anything except his food (Gen. 39:6). Joseph fairness indicated that he 
give equal treatment as he fulfilling Potiphar's house stakeholder need. The third area is on 
accountability, as Joseph monitor the house and reporting to Potiphar. Potiphar left all he had in 
Joseph' hands and did not concern himself about anything (Genesis 39:6). Joseph integrity also 
shows his accountability and transparency. Transparency as the last area can be seen on the result 
of his work and the relationship Joseph has with the principal, Potiphar. 
  Joseph integrity is not without tested but he did not compromise, especially when in 
Potiphar's house he encountered his test on woman. Potiphar's wife tested his integrity (Gen. 39:7; 
12) even though Joseph has proven himself that Potiphar did not concern himself with anything 
except the food that he ate. Joseph stands with his principle as he replies “How could I sin against 
God?” (Gen.39:9). This answer shows his principal-agent relationship, between Potiphar and 
Joseph, and more so between God Almighty, and him, as agent of God in this world. 
Joseph as Prisoner and Steward
 When Joseph in prison, again Joseph's authority does not come from his own gifting, but 
is delegated from others. Joseph is given the responsibility by the prison warden; he does not 
assume it himself. He performs the principal-agent relationship. The prison warden is the principal 
and Joseph was the agent. The prison warden designates Joseph with responsibilities. He placed 
Joseph authority and to be in charge of prison (Gen.39:22-23). Joseph actually is not required to 
serve since he was a prisoner with no obligations to the jailer, but still he was willing to serve. 
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Joseph governance in the prison shows by him administering the very prison as managing warden 
(Alter, 1996, p. 229). 
 Corporate governance was implied in the life of Joseph in prison. In the four areas of 
governance by OECD, Joseph received responsibility by the prison jailer or warden and he 
performs his duty and responsibility through superior skills as he exemplified at the house of 
Potiphar. Joseph was promoted from prisoner to managing warden. The responsibility designate 
was to overseeing the prison to him (Gen. 39:22). The second area is on fairness, the prison warden 
favors Joseph as a managing warden and his work exemplified his fairness towards the prisoner. 
Joseph fairness indicated as he gave equal treatment in fulfilling the prisons' stakeholder need. 
Joseph interpreting the dreams of both Pharaoh courtier, the baker and cup bearer (Gen. 40). The 
third area is on accountability, as Joseph monitor the prison and reporting to the prison warden. The 
prison warden believes in Joseph and trust him that he did not scrutinize anything that was in his 
custody (Genesis 39:23). Joseph integrity is shown again in his prison life and this is also shows his 
accountability and transparency. Transparency as the last area can be seen on the result of his work 
and the relationship Joseph has with the principal, the warden. 
 Joseph integrity is not without test but he did not compromise, especially when in prison 
after he interpret two Pharaoh courtier and was forgotten by the cup bearer as his dream bring him 
back to Pharaoh court. Nonetheless, Joseph integrity keep him doing his duty and responsibility as 
managing warden and this shows his principal-agent relationship, between warden  and Joseph, 
and more so between God Almighty, and him, as agent of God in this world. 
Joseph as Egypt Ruler
 Joseph interpretation of the Pharaoh's dream led him to Egypt highest ranking 
government official. The dream signifies Egypt seven years of harvest and followed by seven 
years of shattering famine. In the astounding turn of event it is to Pharaoh desire to have Joseph, a 
slave prisoner to become ruler of Egypt next to him. Joseph received full authority and he was able 
to implement his plan to escalate grain harvest and store it to reserves built for the purpose to 
prepare Egypt for the coming famine. His programmed plan advances as Egypt was able to fed the 
people during the famine, and further initiating agrarian reform and taxation, thus, increasing 
Pharaoh's influence and power. Furthermore, nation around Egypt and far came for the purpose of 
fulfilling their needs in this devastating time.
 Joseph exemplified foresight and conceptualization in developing strategy to work on 
solution in facing the famine crisis. His skills and vision shows an uncanny ability of administrator 
he is. He even can influence the people to work together in facing the famine crisis. In ensuring the 
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strategy implemented, he was able to motivate the people to succumb in the agrarian reform 
system. Instead of having a revolt because of harvest tax and the agrarian system, Joseph was able 
turn the table and has the people respond in a cry out manner to Joseph saying, “You have saved our 
lives! May we find favor in the eyes of my lord and we will be Pharaoh's servants” (Gen. 47:25).
 Corporate governance is seen at the time of Joseph as the ruler of Egypt. In the four areas 
of governance by OECD, the first area of responsibility, Joseph received responsibility by Pharaoh 
and he performs his duty and responsibility through superior management skills as he exemplified 
at the house of Potiphar and prison. Joseph was promoted from slave prisoner to highest ranking 
government official. Pharaoh entrust Joseph with responsibility to implement his suggestion in 
facing the seven years of harvest and seven years of famine. Pharaoh designates the full authority 
for it. The second area is on fairness. Joseph exemplified fairness in his governance, as seen in 
Genesis 47:25 as the respond of the people resounding how Joseph saves their lives and further 
indicate that Pharaoh and all of Egypt turned to Joseph for guidance and direction during the 
famine crisis. The third area is on accountability, as Joseph overseeing the nation, Genesis 47 
shows his integrity and accountability as the verse noted, “and Joseph brought the money to 
Pharaoh's house” (Gen. 47:14). Joseph integrity shows that his concerned with implementing 
strategy to relief the famine and not by greed or self-interest. Transparency as the last area of 
governance can be seen on the result of his work and the relationship Joseph has with the principal, 
the Pharaoh. Pharaoh knows Joseph past and even welcomes the foreigner to his land (Gen. 47:5-
6). Joseph further in Genesis 47 introduces his father, brothers and families to Pharaoh. He did not 
shy away his past and even heals and repairs the relationship between him and his brothers and 
create unity within his family and also with the house of Pharaoh.
 
 Conclusion
 Joseph story showcase his governance in the land of Egypt. The principal-agent 
relationship he has with the Pharaoh, prison warden, Potiphar and Jacob, his father. In the new era 
of governance, where governance defines as the system by which organizations are directed and 
controlled, and calls on boards of directors to take responsibility for the governance of their firms, 
the agency problem is that agents often have ideas to use capital that lies outside the intent purpose 
of the principals. Governance presents to address this agency problem. Governors act as an 
intermediary, as the principals representative, ensuring capital is directed to the right purpose. The 
governors also act as the voice of the agents to the principals, articulating their ideas for uses of 
capital and making an accounting of the use of capital back to the principals. 
Joseph Story: A Lesson On Corporate Governance
 Joseph has been an agent throughout his life. The life of Joseph shows how he 
exemplifies corporate governance principals of transparency, accountability, responsibility and 
fairness. With power in his hand he did not abuse it and use it for personal gain. The character of 
Joseph exemplifies a model of good corporate governance. He provide example that good 
corporate governance can be exercised as an agent to his principal in the lowliest place on earth, 
and more so an example of good corporate governance to his principal in heaven, God Almighty.  
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